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BIANNUAL SURVEY
should not reap the benefit of a statute of limitations defense be-
cause of a minor defalcation on the part of the plaintiff." 93
In opposition to the foregoing view, it is submitted that a
dismissal under CPLR 3012(b) should be the equivalent of a
dismissal for neglect to prosecute under CPLR 3216. If a plaintiff
does not deem it worthwhile to serve a complaint, this, in itself
would seem to be a neglect to prosecute as a matter of law. Such
neglect to prosecute should not warrant the six-month extension
provided by CPLR 205 (a). So holding would serve as a sufficient
stimulus to plaintiffs who fail to serve their complaint. If, however,
the court finds that the failure to serve the complaint was excusable,
it would not dismiss the action under CPLR 3012(b).
It should be further noted that if the CPLR 3012(b) dismissal
is independent of a CPLR 3216 dismissal, the plaintiff would not
be able to rely upon the forty-five day notice provision of CPLR
3216 to resist a motion under CPLR 3012(b). In any case, it
seems that as soon as a substantial period of time expires after a
defendant demands a complaint under CPLR 3012 (b), the defendant
may move under that section to dismiss the complaint. He may
then label the motion one to dismiss for neglect to prosecute, or
have the motion so treated without labeling it as such. In either
case, the plaintiff would not have to serve a forty-five day demand
as a condition to his motion.9 4
CPLR 3013: Particularity of statements in pleadings.
In Loudin v. Mohawk Airlines, Inc.,9 5 plaintiff sued for de-
famation and other injuries. The appellate division held that the
complaint purporting to allege malicious intent to interfere with
plaintiff's right to employment was insufficient because it stated
neither facts sufficient to show that plaintiff would have obtained
employment but for defendant's interference nor did it plead special
damages by reason of such interference.
Under the CPA, a pleading had to state "material facts."9 6
The present requirement under the CPLR requires statements suf-
ficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the trans-
actions, and the material elements of each cause of action.9 7 The
stress of the new statutory provisions seems to be placed on the
requirement that the pleadings be sufficiently detailed to give the
parties and the court notice of the event relied upon as a cause of
action and of the rule of law being invoked." On the one
93 3 Wrx =sm, KoPN & MmiLmu, Nmv Yopm CIV-L PRACTICz f1 3012.15
(1965).
94 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3012, supp. commentary 49-50 (1965).
9524 App. Div. 2d 447, 260 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st Dep't 1965).
96 CPA § 241.
97 CPLR 3013.
98 FIRsT REP. 261-65.
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hand, in framing the complaint "meticulous particularity should not
be demanded." 19 On the other hand, however, "the allegations
made must indicate some probability that the transaction, if it oc-
curred as stated, supports a right to legal relief."'100
It appears that the CPLR, when viewed as a liberalization of
previous law, 10 ' should mandate that a complaint is sufficient if it
sets forth facts adequate to give rise to a cause of action. Whether
this claim will later be proved must not be considered when con-
sidering the sufficiency of an allegation in a pleading.
For example, with respect to an action for libel or slander,
the CPLR states that "the particular words complained of shall
be set forth in the complaint, but their application to the plaintiff
may be stated generally." 102 A cause of action based upon the
unwarranted interference with the right to employment would fit
well within the meaning of the last part of CPLR 3016(a). That
is, in cases of damaging injury to a person's character, the causal
connection of defendant's act may be stated generally. There
exists some doubt whether the complaint in the instant case should
have burdened the plaintiff to present facts showing that he would have
obtained employment but for defendant's act. Nor does it appear
necessary to require plaintiff's complaint to itemize in the pleading
the special damages incurred. These matters will be of importance
at the trial, but form no proper basis upon which to dismiss a
cause of action when the complaint, taken as a whole, states facts
sufficient to notify a defendant of a claim against him.'3
There is some dispute among authorities as to the necessity
of plaintiff's pleading reflecting an itemization of special damages.
CPLR 3015(d) codified prior case law by requiring that special
damages be itemized. 04  Some authorities advocate strict compliance
with this section, 0 5 while others espouse the more liberal view '106
that "where special damages are not an integral part of the cause of
action . . . 3015(d)'s requirement of itemization should be given
very little if any significance by the courts." 107
19 3 WmismiN, KORN & MILLER, Nmv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE g13013.03
(1965).00 'Ibid.
101 See, e.g., CPLR 104, 3014, 3026.
102 CPLR 3016(a).
103 See Hewitt v. Maass, 41 Misc. 2d 894, 246 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1964); see generally The Biannual Survey of New York
Practice, 39 ST. JonN's L. REv. 406, 437-39 (1965).
104 See The Biannuwal Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
406, 425-27 (1964).
1053 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CrviL PRAcricE 113015.19
(1965).
106 7B MCKINNEYS CPLR 3015, supp. commentary 84 (1965) ; see generally
7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3013, supp. commentary 64 (1965).
107 Ibid.
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It would appear that the cause of action stated in the instant
complaint would not necessitate the itemization of special damages
in the light of the latter approach. Nonetheless, it should be noted
that if the complaint in the instant case was deemed to be one in
prima fade tort the special damages would be an "element of the
cause of action itself" and would, therefore, require the itemization."' 8
It appears that the court in the instant case is creating a
strict rule that both elements, viz., that plaintiff would have obtained
employment but for the defendant's act and the incidence of special
damages, are integral parts of the cause of action alleged and
would, therefore, not only have to be proved, but also would have
to be specifically pleaded. It seems difficult to consider the instant
action to be one in prima facie tort, where special damages would
have to be itemized, unless we admit that a cause of action for
wrongful interference with the right to employment is only as new
as the advent of New York's recent theory of prima facie tort.
Adhering to the reasoning in the instant case, if the pleadings
show that the plaintiff is entitled to some relief, whether legal
or equitable, and if the pleadings conform to the notice require-
ment of CPLR 3013, the fact that the plaintiff has failed to allege
other facts will not be a ground for a dismissal of the complaint.
This is generally true unless it is determined that the facts not
pleaded formed an integral part of the cause of action.
CPLR 3025(b).: Amendment of pleadings allowed when not
prejudicial.
In Stillwell v. Giant Supply Corp.,109 an action for personal
injuries and loss of services, Giant's insurer admitted that defendant
owned the vehicle involved in the collision and that defendant
Akines, an infant, was operating it with the knowledge and consent
of Giant. During the course of pretrial examinations it was
ascertained that defendant Akines did not have Giant's consent
to operate the vehicle and Giant, therefore, sought to deny its
operation of the vehicle. The court held that if the plaintiffs were
"qualified persons" within the provisions of the Insurance Law
governing MVAIC,"1 their time to file a notice of claim with
MVAIC would have expired. Accordingly, defendant Giant was
not entitled to amend its answer until it was determined whether
the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by the granting of a motion per-
mitting such amendment.
108 Ibid.
109 47 Misc. 2d 568, 262 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
310 N.Y. INs. LAw § 608(a); see Note, 39 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 321, 325-30
(1965).
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